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“Children are Different”:
Constitutional Values and Justice Policy
Elizabeth S. Scott∗
This essay explores the importance for Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence and for juvenile crime regulation of Miller v. Alabama
(2012) and two earlier Supreme Court opinions rejecting harsh
sentences for juveniles. It argues that the Court has broken new ground
in defining juveniles as a category of offenders who are subject to special
Eighth Amendment protections. In Miller and in Graham v. Florida
(2010) particularly, the Court has applied to juveniles’ non-capital
sentences the rigorous proportionality review that, for adults, has been
reserved for death sentences. The essay then turns to the implications of
the opinions for juvenile crime policy, arguing that the Court has
embraced a developmental model of youth crime regulation and elevated
this approach to one that is grounded in constitutional values and
principles. This approach represents a forceful repudiation of the
punitive law reforms of the late twentieth century, when the relevance of
adolescents’ developmental immaturity to justice policy was either
ignored or rejected. The opinions offer four key lessons for lawmakers.
The first is that juvenile offenders are different from and less culpable
than adults and should usually be subject to more lenient criminal
sanctions. The second lesson is that decisions to subject juveniles to
adult prosecution and punishment should be “unusual” and
individualized—made by a judge in a transfer hearing and not through
categorical legislative waiver. The third lesson is that sanctions should
focus on maximizing young offenders’ potential for reform. The final
lesson is that developmental science can guide and inform juvenile crime
regulation in useful ways. These four lessons, formulated by our
preeminent legal institution and embodying constitutional values, are
likely to have a profound influence on the future direction of youth crime
regulation.

∗
Harold R. Medina Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. Many thanks to Joshua
Dressler, Henry Monaghan, Robert Schwartz, Laurence Steinberg and participants at a workshop at
Columbia Law School for helpful comments on this essay. Thanks also to Annie Steinberg, who
provided excellent research assistance.
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Three times in the past seven years the Supreme Court has held that imposing
harsh criminal sentences on juvenile offenders violates the Eighth Amendment
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. Most recently, Miller v. Alabama 1
(2012) prohibited the mandatory imposition of the sentence of life without parole
[LWOP] on a juvenile convicted of homicide. This opinion followed Roper v.
Simmons 2 (2005), in which the Court rejected the imposition of the death penalty
for a crime committed by a juvenile, and Graham v. Florida 3 (2010), holding that
no minor could be sentenced to LWOP for a nonhomicide offense. In these
opinions, the Court has broken new ground in Eighth Amendment doctrine,
creating a special status for juvenile offenders. Just as importantly, the Court’s
constitutional approach to these sentencing challenges powerfully reinforces an
emerging regulatory approach to juvenile criminal activity and promises to
influence its future direction. With increasing clarity, the Court has announced a
broad principle grounded in developmental knowledge that “children are
different” 4 from adult offenders and that these differences are important to the
law’s response to youthful criminal conduct. To be sure, the Court’s description of
adolescent offenders as “children” exaggerates their immaturity in ways that may
generate resistance.5 Nonetheless, this powerful statement represents a sound
repudiation of distorted stereotypes of young criminals that dominated in the 1990s
and implicitly challenges the punitive laws adopted during that period as offensive
to constitutional values.
The Eighth Amendment opinions offer two consistent messages—that
juveniles who commit offenses are less culpable than their adult counterparts and
that they are more likely to reform. These conclusions are based on a
proportionality analysis that draws on behavioral and neurobiological research to
delineate the attributes of adolescence that distinguish teenage offending from
adult criminal activity: these traits include adolescents’ propensity for taking risks
without considering future consequences; their vulnerability to external influences,
particularly of peers; and their unformed characters. 6 The transient nature of these
developmental influences is also important, because it suggests that juveniles are
1

132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
543 U.S. 551 (2005).
3
130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
4
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2470.
5
Both the majority and the dissent in the juvenile opinions assume that adolescents must be
classified either as children or as fully responsible adults. More accurately, young offenders belong
in an intermediate category of individuals who are less culpable than their adult counterparts, but who
bear responsibility for their offenses. See ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING
JUVENILE JUSTICE 123–39 (2008). Although the Court clearly understands the nature and extent of
the developmental differences between adolescent and adult offenders, its description of young
offenders as “children” perpetuates a rhetorical mischaracterization that has had a polarizing effect on
public discourse, generating outrage among hard-line critics. Id. at 120–23.
6
See infra Part I.D.
2
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likely to desist from involvement in criminal activity as they mature; thus they are
less likely than their adult counterparts to be “incorrigible” criminals. This
scientific evidence, in the Court’s view, creates a sound foundation for its new
principle. This principle is now embedded in Eighth Amendment doctrine and will
inevitably be invoked in future constitutional challenges to criminal punishment of
juveniles.
The Court has created a special status for juveniles through doctrinal moves
that had little precedent in its earlier Eighth Amendment cases. In its willingness
to find severe adult sentences to be excessive for juveniles, the Court elevated the
prominence of proportionality, setting aside the deference to legislatures that is a
strong theme in modern Eighth Amendment law and molding constitutional
doctrine in a new direction. First, the Court applied to the non-capital sentence of
LWOP the rigorous proportionality review previously reserved for the death
penalty, categorically prohibiting the sentence for nonhomicide offenses 7 and
mandating an individualized hearing before it could be imposed for homicide. 8
Moreover, its judgment that LWOP was unconstitutionally harsh as applied to
juveniles was not based on substantial evidence of a national consensus supporting
this conclusion—the objective measure that aims to preserve legislative
prerogative even in death penalty cases.9 Instead, the Court relied almost
exclusively on its developmentally-informed proportionality analysis, brushing
aside the complaint by the dissenting Justices in Graham and Miller that many
state statutes authorized the contested sentences. 10

7

The Court has prohibited the imposition of the death penalty for offenses other than
intentional killing and for certain categories of offenders, such as mentally retarded offenders and
juveniles. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (holding that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits the death penalty as punishment for the rape of a child); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304
(2002) (holding that execution of mentally retarded individuals violates the Eighth Amendment);
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding that the death penalty was grossly disproportionate
to the crime of rape).
8
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion) (prohibiting
mandatory imposition of death penalty and requiring that defendant be evaluated individually,
including evaluating mitigating factors). In evaluating whether non-capital adult sentences are
excessive, the Court has required “gross disproportionality,” a standard adopted from Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (plurality opinion). See, e.g.,
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 23 (2003) (“The proportionality principles in our cases distilled in
Justice Kennedy's concurrence guide our application of the Eighth Amendment . . . .”). The gross
disproportionality standard is almost never met. See, e.g., id. at 30 (life sentence under three strikes
statute for third felony involving theft of a golf club is not grossly disproportionate); Lockyer v.
Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003). The Court before Miller held that the prohibition of a mandatory
sentence only applied to the death penalty and not to non-capital sentences. See Harmelin, 501 U.S.
at 1006.
9
The Court has emphasized the need to review legislative enactments and jury sentencing
outcomes as “objective indicia that reflect the public attitude toward a given sanction.” Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173, 181 (1976); see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 324.
10
See infra Part I.D.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2191711

74

OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW

[Vol 11:1

Despite the Court’s emphatic announcement that “children are different” from
adults, it is hard to predict future developments in Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence as applied to juveniles. But youth advocates will find reasons for
optimism in the Court’s strong endorsement in Miller of the importance of
considering youth and immaturity in sentencing decisions involving juveniles. Its
seemingly gratuitous admonishment that sentences of LWOP should be
“uncommon” 11 and rarely imposed may ultimately result in the categorical
abolition of this sentence for juveniles, as Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Thomas and Alito predict in dissenting opinions. 12 Just as intriguing, and with
more far reaching implications, is the Court’s insistence that the features of
adolescence that reduce the culpability of young offenders are not crime specific—
that they were as relevant to homicide in Miller as to nonhomicide offenses in
Graham. 13 Implicit in this generalization is a broader principle that the same
attributes of adolescence that mitigate the culpability of the youths whose crimes
the Court has reviewed reduce the blameworthiness of juveniles’ criminal choices
generally.
Whether the Court will apply this broader principle as a constitutional
restraint on the sentencing of juveniles is uncertain; but even if the Court extends
Miller no further, the policy ramifications of these opinions are likely to prove
substantial. The decisions embody a set of constitutional values mandating fair
treatment of young offenders. They also draw on an understanding of juvenile
crime and of the justice system’s appropriate response that offers several key
lessons for lawmakers: that juvenile offenders are different from and less culpable
than adults and should usually be subject to different treatment; that decisions to
subject juveniles to adult prosecution and punishment should be “unusual” and
individualized; that sanctions should focus on maximizing young offenders’
potential for reform; and that developmental science can inform juvenile crime
regulation in useful ways. 14 These four lessons, formulated by our preeminent legal
institution, are likely to have a profound influence on the future direction of youth
crime regulation.
Lawmakers today are rethinking punitive policies that were adopted in a
climate of fear and hostility toward juvenile offenders in the late twentieth
century. 15 This new wave of reform recognizes that retaining juveniles in a
separate system where they receive developmentally appropriate dispositions is
more likely to promote both fairness and efficient crime reduction than policies
11

Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012).
In his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts speculates, “the Court’s gratuitous prediction [that
LWOP for juveniles should be uncommon] appears to be nothing other than an invitation to overturn
life without parole sentences . . . .” Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2481 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
13
Id. at 2465 (majority opinion).
14
See discussion of these lessons, infra Part II.B.
15
See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 94–117 (2008) (describing moral panics of the
1990s and their impact on law reform).
12
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that ignore differences between juveniles and adults. 16 The recent Supreme Court
opinions reinforce this developmental approach and elevate its stature to one
grounded in constitutional principle—a message that is likely to resonate
powerfully with policymakers. Following a long period in which the relevance to
criminal punishment of differences between juvenile and adult offenders was either
ignored or denied, the recent Supreme Court opinions signal forcefully that
policies that ignore these differences offend constitutional values.
The essay will proceed in two parts. Part I will focus on Miller and the earlier
juvenile sentencing opinions, arguing that the Court has indeed created a special
status for juvenile offenders in Eighth Amendment doctrine. Part II will explore
the implications for juvenile crime regulation of these opinions, setting the
opinions in the political and legal context of late twentieth and early twenty-first
century juvenile crime regulation and then exploring the lessons the opinions offer
for lawmakers.
I. CREATING A SPECIAL CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS FOR JUVENILE OFFENDERS
At first blush, Miller v. Alabama appears to be a narrow decision, simply
establishing a procedural requirement before juveniles can be sentenced to LWOP.
But this Part shows that such a reading is misleading and that Miller is at least as
important as the Court’s earlier opinions in creating a special status for juvenile
offenders under the Eighth Amendment. In combination with Graham, Miller
represents an important extension of Eighth Amendment doctrine into new
territory. The Court applied safeguards against excessive punishment of juveniles
that are far more rigorous than those it has applied to the sentencing of adults even
(arguably) in the death penalty context. 17 Moreover, the constitutional principle
announced in Miller—“children are different”—is likely to have a far reaching
impact beyond the decision’s modest holding.
The two cases that were joined in Miller 18 presented the Court with several
options aside from simply upholding the petitioners’ sentences or rejecting LWOP
for juveniles altogether. Both petitioners were fourteen years old at the time they
committed their crimes, so the Court might have found LWOP to be cruel and
unusual punishment as applied to younger juveniles. 19 This was the approach that
the Court adopted when it first considered a challenge to the juvenile death penalty
in the 1980s. In two opinions, the Court found the death penalty unconstitutional
16

See generally id. at 226–29.
See infra notes 63–70 (discussing Graham and Miller’s seeming abandonment of the
objective measure of excessive punishment under the “evolving standard of decency” test).
18
The two state court cases were Jackson v. Norris, 378 S.W.3d 103 (Ark. 2011) and Miller
v. State, 63 So.3d 676 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010).
19
In their brief, Petitioners argue that the Court could “discern a satisfactory basis for
[prohibiting LWOP for juveniles below] one of several different ages” above the age of fourteen.
Brief for Petitioner at 61, Jackson v. Hobbs, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011) (No. 10-9647).
17
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under the Eighth Amendment as applied to fifteen-year-old offenders, 20 but not as
applied to sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds. 21 Alternatively, the Court might have
prohibited the sentence of LWOP for youths who did not intend to kill. Kuntrell
Jackson, whose case was joined with that of Evan Miller, was not the trigger man
in the video store hold up that resulted in the clerk’s death. He stood outside as the
crime unfolded and there was no evidence that he intended to kill the victim. 22
Justice Breyer in concurrence would have prohibited the sentence of LWOP
without evidence of such intent, 23 but the majority did not base its holding on this
distinction. Instead, the Court focused on the mandatory nature of the sentence.
Both the Alabama and Arkansas statutes required the sentencing court to impose
LWOP on defendants convicted of murder. The Court held that this harsh sentence
could only be imposed on a juvenile after the youth had the opportunity to produce
evidence of mitigation. 24
Because its holding was limited to this procedural requirement, Miller appears
more modest in its reach than the two earlier juvenile sentencing decisions. In
Roper, the Court categorically rejected the death penalty as unconstitutionally
excessive punishment for a crime committed by a juvenile. Graham followed suit
by holding that no minor could be sentenced to LWOP for a nonhomicide offense.
Miller, in contrast, simply prohibited a mandatory sentence of LWOP for
homicide, requiring an individualized inquiry as to whether the sentence is
appropriate. In theory, every youth charged with homicide in a state in which the
sentence is authorized (including Kuntrell Jackson) could receive LWOP after the
required hearing.
Nonetheless, for several reasons, Miller is a far more powerful statement of
how juveniles should be dealt with in the justice system than its narrow holding
might suggest. First, in strong language, the Court made clear that it expected the
20
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1989) (holding that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits execution of defendant convicted of committing murder when he was fifteen years old).
21
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (execution for crimes committed by
sixteen- or seventeen-year-olds does not violate Eighth Amendment).
22
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2461 (2012) (describing Jackson’s offense). Miller in
contrast intentionally killed the victim of his homicide, repeatedly hitting him with a baseball bat, and
saying, at one point, “I am God, I’ve come to take your life.” Id. at 2462.
23
Id. at 2475–77 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer’s position was a natural extension of
the Graham analysis, in which the Court (and Justice Roberts in concurrence) emphasized that the
juvenile who did not intend to kill was less culpable than one who did. Justice Breyer’s concurrence
was also consistent with the Court’s reasoning in Enmund v. Florida in which the Court rejected the
death penalty for defendants convicted of felony murder who neither killed nor intended to kill the
victim. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
24
The Court does not clarify whether a separate hearing is required before LWOP can be
imposed, as it would be in the death penalty setting, in which defendant can introduce mitigating
evidence. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976). It is possible that the
defendant’s ability to contribute mitigating evidence to be incorporated into the probation report
might be deemed sufficient.
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sentence of LWOP to be “uncommon”; 25 only the rare juvenile will deserve this
sentence. The dissenters recognized that this stern admonition potentially might
become a self-fulfilling prophesy. 26 Second, Miller made explicit a theme that the
Court began to develop in Graham—that juveniles represent a special category for
Eighth Amendment purposes. In evaluating whether LWOP for juveniles violates
“the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,” 27
the Court applied to juveniles facing LWOP what might be called “proportionality
analysis with teeth,” previously reserved for the review of death sentences.
Moreover, the Court in Graham and Miller found the challenged sentence to be
constitutionality deficient even without a demonstration that it objectively violated
national sentencing norms—a measure required (at least ostensibly) even in death
penalty cases.28 Indeed, as the dissenters argued, it would be difficult to argue that
statutes imposing mandatory LWOP on juvenile murderers violated these objective
norms, given that such statutes were in force in twenty-nine states prior to Miller. 29
To an extraordinary extent, the Court relied on its own developmentally-based
proportionality analysis in concluding that the sentence was excessive. I will argue
that, notwithstanding the dissenting Justices’ protests, this analysis provided a
solid and objective basis for the Court’s conclusion that LWOP is an excessive
sentence because of juveniles’ reduced culpability. Finally, Miller is important
because its proportionality analysis supports a general mitigation principle to be
applied to adolescent criminal choices, with implications extending far beyond the
sentence of LWOP.
A. LWOP: An “Uncommon” Sentence
The Court in Miller appears to have been somewhat conflicted about the reach
of the opinion. On the one hand, the majority emphasized that it was only creating
a procedural requirement that must precede the imposition of LWOP on a
juvenile—allowing the youth to introduce mitigating evidence of immaturity; a
25

Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469 (“But given all we have said in Roper, Graham, and this decision
about children’s diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change, we think appropriate
occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon.”).
26
Justice Thomas argues in his dissent that the Court’s decision “may well cause trial judges
to shy away from imposing life without parole sentences and embolden appellate judges to set them
aside when they are imposed.” Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2486 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
27
In Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958) (plurality opinion), Chief Justice Warren
defined the standard for determining a punishment is “cruel” under the Eighth Amendment. Because
the words “cruel” and “unusual” from the Amendment are “not precise” and “their scope is not
static”, Chief Justice Warren concluded that the Amendment “must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of maturing society.”
28
Id.; See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 451 (2002) (standard applied to find use of death
penalty for retarded persons unconstitutional).
29
Miller challenged the statutes of twenty-nine states that imposed mandatory LWOP for
defendants convicted of murder. 132 S. Ct. at 2478 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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mature and particularly culpable youth could be sentenced to LWOP.30 Perhaps
even more suggestive of a modest aim, the Court declined to apply the logic of
Graham to Jackson’s felony murder. In prohibiting LWOP for nonhomicide
offenses, Graham emphasized the reduced culpability of young offenders whose
crimes involved no intent to kill another person. 31 But Miller does not hold that
LWOP would always be inappropriate for the youth convicted of felony murder
absent proof of an intent to kill the victim.
The Court complicated Miller’s modest ambition, however, by emphatically
(and gratuitously, a critic might say) underscoring that it expected the sentence of
LWOP to be “uncommon” given the diminished culpability of youth. The Court
repeated its earlier admonition in Roper and Graham that it was extraordinarily
difficult to distinguish in adolescence the youth whose crime was a product of
“transient immaturity” from the “rare juvenile” whose crime reflects “irreparable
corruption.” 32 This difficulty, and the resulting risk that some immature youths
might receive harsh sentences, justified categorical bans in the earlier opinions—
even as the Court acknowledged that some (unusual) youths might deserve the
proscribed sentences. 33 In Miller, the possibility of error led the Court to issue a
stern warning to sentencing courts and juries that LWOP was constitutionally
permissible only in unusual cases of mature and culpable juveniles, implying that
more frequent use would be unacceptable. 34
The implications of this warning were not lost on the dissenting Justices.
Chief Justice Roberts noted correctly that “uncommon” is a synonym for
“unusual” in Eighth Amendment parlance; he predicted that the next step would be
a categorical bar of the sentence of LWOP for juveniles. 35 Justice Thomas pointed
out that sentencers and reviewing courts were likely to take the Court’s warning to
heart and refuse to impose LWOP on juveniles convicted of homicide. The
resulting infrequency of this sentence might ultimately become the basis for a
future categorical ban.36 This scenario is plausible, although the Court’s warning
30

Thus the Court deflected the criticism of Justice Alito, who, in dissent, challenged the
holding by offering the case of a seventeen and a half year old who bombed a mall, killing several
people. Id. at 2487 (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Kagan responded that under the required
procedure, this juvenile might well receive a sentence of LWOP. Id. at 2469 n.8 (majority opinion).
31
The Court in Graham noted, “. . . when compared to an adult murderer, a juvenile offender
who did not kill or intend to kill has a twice diminished moral culpability.” Graham v. Florida, 130
S. Ct. 2011, 2027 (2010).
32
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.
33
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572 (2005); Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026–27 (quoted in
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469).
34
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. A student author argues (sensibly) that the Court’s presumption
that the vast majority of juvenile offenders are immature justifies shifting the burden of proof,
requiring the state to demonstrate the absence of diminished culpability. The Supreme Court, 2011
Term—Leading Cases, 126 HARV. L. REV. 176, 286 (2012).
35
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2481 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
36
Id. at 2486 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
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will only have the influence that the dissenters feared if lawmakers embrace the
broader lessons for juvenile crime regulation embodied in these opinions—a
subject to which I will return.
B. Expanding the Eighth Amendment Boundary
1. A Proportionality Analysis “with Teeth”
Miller is an important case because it makes explicit a theme that the Court
began to develop in Graham: that juveniles represent a very special category for
Eighth Amendment purposes. They are a class of offenders who are entitled to
protections when they face a sentence of LWOP that adults receive only when
facing a death sentence. In rejecting the mandatory imposition of LWOP and
finding it to be a presumptively excessive punishment for juveniles, the Court
departed from its well-established response to Eighth Amendment claims
involving non-capital sentences.
To demonstrate how Miller and Graham cases break new ground in Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence, a little doctrinal background may be helpful. The
modern Court has adopted a two-track approach to reviewing the constitutionality
of criminal sentences under the Eighth Amendment, reviewing death sentences far
more rigorously than non-capital sentences. 37 The mantra “Death is different” 38 is
embedded in Eighth Amendment doctrine. Death sentences have long been subject
to an independent assessment by the Court to be certain that the criminal law’s
harshest sanction is not disproportionate punishment, given the circumstances of
the offense and attributes of the offender. 39 The Court has imposed procedural
safeguards to ensure that the capital punishment is proportionate to the offense,
including the requirement that a death sentence cannot be mandatory, and that the
defendant must be allowed to introduce mitigating evidence to persuade the
sentencer that he does not deserve the most severe sentence. 40 Further, on
occasion, the Court has held the death penalty to be disproportionate as applied to

37

See Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional
Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1145 (2009) (describing and
critiquing the two-track approach under Eighth Amendment doctrine used to review capital and noncapital sentences).
38
Id. at 1146.
39
Id.
40
See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion) (striking
down mandatory capital statutes because “the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the
Eighth Amendment” requires individual review of the circumstances of the offender and offense prior
to delivering a capital sentence); see also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality
opinion) (rejecting a semi-mandatory capital sentencing scheme because sentencers must “not be
precluded from considering [mitigating factors] . . .the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence
less than death”)
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a category of offenders, such as mentally retarded persons 41 or juveniles. 42 It has
also prohibited the imposition of the death penalty for particular crimes that it
deems to be less blameworthy than intentional killing. Thus the death penalty
cannot be imposed as punishment for rape 43 (including rape of a child 44) or felony
murder where the defendant was not the actual killer and had no proven intent to
kill. 45 These crimes, the Court has concluded, are simply not sufficiently
blameworthy to warrant the most severe punishment.
But the modern Court has declined to undertake meaningful proportionality
review of non-capital sentences. Although, in theory, a sentence found to be
“grossly excessive” 46 could be overturned, the Court has emphasized that a
successful challenge would be “exceedingly rare.” 47 In recent years, it has not
overturned an adult non-capital sentence on proportionality grounds. 48 For
example, a divided Court upheld a life sentence under California’s three strikes
law of a man whose third offense involved the theft of a golf club. 49 The Court has
justified its deferential stance as an effort to avoid encroaching on legislative
judgments through “subjective” evaluations of whether sentences are excessive. 50
41

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
The Court first restricted the death penalty for juveniles aged fifteen and younger in
Thompson v. Oklahoma, emphasizing that youthful immaturity reduces culpability. 487 U.S. 815,
835 (1988). However, a year later the Court upheld the death penalty for juveniles aged sixteen and
seventeen. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989). In Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
553 (2005), the Court revisited the juvenile death penalty two years after the ruling in Atkins, 536
U.S. (2002), holding it to be unconstitutional under a proportionality analysis the death penalty for all
juveniles.
43
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding that the death penalty was grossly
disproportionate to the crime of rape).
44
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits
the death penalty as punishment for the rape of a child).
45
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (holding that the Eighth Amendment does not
permit the death penalty for a defendant who aids or abets a felony which results in a murder by
others, when the defendant did not intend or attempt the murder himself).
46
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1005 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (plurality
opinion).
47
Id. at 1001 (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980)).
48
The most recent opinion rejecting a non-capital sentence on proportionality grounds was
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 299–300 (1983) in which the Court overturned a mandatory life
sentence for an offender’s seventh non-violent felony (writing a non-account check for $100).
49
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (upholding life sentence); see also Lockyer v.
Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70 (2003) (denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus while upholding a
life sentence for three petty thefts, the third of which was the theft of video tapes worth $70).
50
See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272, 275 (1980). The Court declined to apply the
proportionality analysis from capital cases to a non-capital recidivism statute, highlighting the
difference between the death penalty and term of years sentences. The Court noted that objectivity is
possible in analyzing whether the death penalty is excessive in a particular case because it could
“draw a ‘bright line’ between the punishment of death and the various other permutations and
commutations of punishments short of that ultimate sanction . . . this line was considerably clearer
42
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On its view, death can readily be distinguished from other sentences, but there is
no objective basis for determining that a particular term-of-years sentence is
disproportionate as punishment for a particular crime. 51 Accordingly, any
conclusion that a sentence is excessive necessarily would amount to a subjective
judgment by the Justices. Moreover, the Court has assumed that a sentence can be
justified for purposes of proportionality review under preventive as well as
retributive theories of punishment. Thus a sentence that might be excessive under
conventional retributive theory could stand because it serves a deterrent purpose.52
Not surprisingly, the Court has upheld a mandatory life sentencing scheme for
adult offenders, observing that there is no “requirement of individualized
sentencing in noncapital cases.” 53
Graham and Miller make clear that, for purposes of Eighth Amendment
review of non-capital sentences (at least LWOP), juveniles are entitled to greater
protection than adults. The Court in these opinions set aside its typical deference
to legislatures and applied constraints and protections for juveniles subjected to
LWOP that previously were reserved to the death penalty context. For example,
Graham represents the only occasion on which the Court has categorically banned
a sentence other than death on Eighth Amendment grounds. Miller required a
procedural protection for juveniles that adults only receive when facing the death
penalty, holding that the sentence of LWOP cannot be mandatory and that a youth
convicted of murder must be allowed to introduce mitigating evidence. 54
In these opinions, the Court based its judgment that LWOP was excessive for
juveniles on the same proportionality analysis that was at the heart of Roper. In
fact, as I suggest below, this developmentally-grounded rationale for treating
juvenile offenders more leniently than adults is perhaps even more central to the
outcomes in the LWOP cases than in Roper. 55 The Court also underscored the
robustness of the proportionality analysis in these later opinions by emphasizing
that the scientific evidence relevant to evaluating the criminal choices of juveniles
than would be any constitutional distinction between one term of years and a shorter or longer term of
years.”
51
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (finding no basis for concluding that
a twenty-five year sentence violates the Eighth Amendment but a fifteen year sentence does not
(citing Solem, 463 U.S. at 294)).
52
Id. at 999; see infra note 73 (discussion of proportionality as based on retribution and the
Court’s more expansive conception to include preventive goals).
53
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1006. The Court emphasized that the prohibition of mandatory
sentencing was limited to the death penalty context.
54
Harmelin upheld a mandatory life sentence (precluding the opportunity to introduce
mitigating evidence) for an adult offender. The Court distinguishes Miller from Harmelin, noting
that “Harmelin had nothing to do with children and did not purport to apply its holding to the
sentencing of juvenile offenders. We have by now held on multiple occasions that a sentencing rule
permissible for adults may not be so for children.” Miller v. Alabama 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2470 (2012).
55
I argue below that the objective comparative analysis of national legal trends played a
smaller role in Miller than in the earlier cases. See infra Part I.D.
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versus adults was even stronger than in Roper—with new brain research
confirming and reinforcing the behavioral research cited in the earlier opinion. 56
2. Juvenile LWOP and National Sentencing Norms
Graham and Miller went beyond previous adult death penalty cases in their
reliance on the Court’s independent proportionality analysis. Indeed, as the
dissenting Justices explained in great detail, Miller gave little weight to national
sentencing norms in assessing mandatory LWOP for juveniles.
In evaluating whether a death sentence constitutes excessive punishment
under the Eighth Amendment, the Court typically (at least formally) has
undertaken a two-part inquiry. One part is the independent proportionality review
described above; the second is a determination of whether a national consensus
holds the sentence to be excessive. In undertaking this inquiry, the Court has
examined legislative trends and sentencing practices across jurisdictions to provide
an external objective measure of contemporary norms. 57 These inquiries aim to
evaluate whether the sentence offends “evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society.” 58 In theory, the review of national sentencing
trends could be undertaken in a non-capital case as well, but the Court has made
clear that this would be required only in the rare case in which the threshold
requirement of “gross disproportionality” is first met. 59
Modern scholars have found the “evolving standards of decency” test to be
generally unsatisfactory and have leveled sharp (and legitimate) criticisms against
the test and its application by the Court. First, skeptics have challenged the
premise of the standard—that an advanced society moves inexorably toward more
lenient sentences. This assumption is belied by late twentieth century sentencing
policy. 60 Beyond this, the objective prong has been faulted on the ground that
56

Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010) (citing Brief for American Med. Ass’n et
al. as Amici Curiae at 16–24, Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (No. 08-7412); Brief for
American Psychological Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae at 22–27, Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011
(2010) (No. 08-7412). Miller amplified this message. See infra note 88.
57
See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (plurality opinion). This
comparison sometimes extends to a comparison with sentencing practices in other countries. See,
e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 576 (2005) (citing to the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child and law in other countries to show that very few countries allowed the death
penalty to be imposed for crimes committed by juveniles); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10
(1977) (noting that only three out of sixty major nations retained the death penalty for rape that did
not result in death).
58
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (describing evolving standards of decency
standard); see supra note 27.
59
See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (plurality opinion).
60
See infra Part II.A.2. In his dissent in Graham v. Florida, Justice Thomas argued “the
Court pretermits in all but one direction the evolution of the standards it describes, thus calling a
constitutional halt to what may well be a pendulum swing in social attitudes and stunting legislative
consideration of new questions of penal policy as they emerge.” 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2045 (2010)
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comparisons between the challenged sentence and national trends often seem
strained and the inquiry sometimes appears to be outcome-driven. 61 But the
comparative analysis has been defended as an effort to discern whether the
sentence is problematic on grounds more substantial than that it offends a majority
of Justices on the Supreme Court. 62 Under textbook Eighth Amendment doctrine,
only if a sentence violates widely held societal norms about proportionate
punishment should the Court override legislative choice and find it to be cruel and
unusual punishment.
The Court has increasingly deemphasized this comparative analysis in the
juvenile cases, relying instead on its independent proportionality assessment as the
basis for rejecting harsh sentences. Roper evaluated legislative trends and
sentencing practices regarding the juvenile death penalty and found a modest trend
toward rejection of the sentence. 63 But the national consensus inquiry became less
important in Graham and played almost no role in Miller. In Graham, for
example, because many states authorized juvenile LWOP for nonhomicide
offenses, the Court looked only to actual sentencing practices and concluded that
the sentence was seldom imposed. 64 Miller virtually abandoned any effort to
discern a national consensus, partly because the contested sentence was imposed
relatively frequently due to its mandatory nature.65 Instead the Court concluded
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Justice Thomas also
noted that states have consistently increased the severity of sentences imposed on juveniles. Id. at
2050; see also John F. Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality Under the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 899, 919–20 (2011) (critiquing the standard and noting that
“societal attitudes have become harsher and more punitive, not less so,” so that under the evolving
standards of decency test, courts are unable to overrule new punishments that “. . . enjoy public
support, for the fact that they enjoy public support shows that they comport with current standards of
decency.”).
61
Stinneford makes this point: “Because the punishments challenged before the Supreme
Court usually involve divided societal opinion, application of the evolving standards of decency test
rarely leads to a plausible decision to declare a punishment unconstitutional.” Id. at 919.
62
See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 174–76 (1976).
63
Roper v. Simmons pointed to the states that had abolished the juvenile death penalty in the
years since it had upheld the sentence for sixteen and seventeen year olds in Stanford v. Kentucky.
Since Stanford, five states had abolished the death penalty for minors (four abolished it legislatively
and one state rejected it by way of judicial decision). 543 U.S. 551, 564–65 (2005). The Court
compared legislation prohibiting the juvenile death penalty with the trend abolishing the death
penalty for mentally retarded persons. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (abolishing the
death penalty for retarded persons).
64
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2023 (2010). At the time, thirty-seven states
authorized LWOP for juvenile nonhomicide offenders. However, only 109 juveniles were serving
LWOP for nonhomicide crimes.
65
In the twenty-nine states with mandatory LWOP statutes for homicide, challenged in
Miller, all defendants convicted as adults of murder received the sentence; 2,500 prisoners serving
LWOP were sentenced under these statutes for crimes committed as juveniles. The Court suggested
that the statutory scheme did not reflect an explicit legislative judgment that the sentence was
appropriate for juveniles, since juveniles became eligible for mandatory LWOP indirectly on the
basis of their transfer to adult court. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2459 (2012).
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that LWOP was presumptively excessive for juveniles almost wholly on the basis
of the scientifically-based analysis of attributes of adolescents that make juveniles
less culpable and more likely to reform than adult offenders.
Not surprisingly, the dissenting Justices and other critics railed at what was
viewed as flimsy evidence that the imposition of LWOP on juvenile offenders
offended any objective standard of decency. 66 In Graham, the dissenters noted
that a majority of states authorized LWOP for nonhomicide offenses committed by
juveniles; they dismissed the small number of actual sentences as inadequate
evidence of an emerging national consensus opposing LWOP. But the dissenting
Justices expressed particular outrage in Miller, given the large number of
individuals serving LWOP for homicides committed as juveniles. 67 Chief Justice
Roberts also noted that mandatory LWOP statutes in fact were a relatively modern
reform, 68 challenging the assumption that standards of decency evolve in the
direction of ever more lenient criminal punishment.69 In the view of critics, the
juvenile opinions represent an illegitimate encroachment on legislative prerogative
based on the subjective paternalistic judgment by the liberal Justices that juveniles
should not be subject to harsh punishment.70
C. Proportionality Analysis in a Developmental Framework
Without question, the Court primarily relied on its independent
proportionality assessment in its judgment that the challenged sentences
represented cruel and unusual punishment for juveniles. But the criticism directed
at the opinions underestimates the robustness of this analysis and the extent to
which it provides an objective basis for the conclusion that juveniles deserve less
punishment than their adult counterparts. This framework for analyzing juvenile
66

The dissenting justices also rejected the claim that a national consensus existed opposing
the juvenile death penalty, given the small number of states that had repealed the sentence since
Stanford. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 564.
67
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2459.
68
Id. at 2480 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
69
Id. at 2478. John Stinneford criticizes the evolving standards of decency theory as being
inappropriately focused on current public opinion and argues that courts should instead reject
punishments that are “contrary to long usage” and thus inappropriately “unusual” under the Eighth
Amendment. John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment as a
Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739, 1746–47, 1752–54 (2008).
70
Richard Posner critiques the Justices’ inability to act as “neutral experts” in Roper and
accuses the Court of ignoring “both the evidence that contradicted their desired result and the
limitations of the body of evidence that appeared to support that result.” Richard Posner, Foreword:
A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 66 (2005). Justice Alito in his Miller dissent was
particularly offended by the majority describing young criminals, including his hypothetical 17-½year-old bomb thrower, as “children.” Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2487 (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice
Thomas accused the majority of being overly subjective, arguing that “Eighth Amendment cases are
no longer tied to any objective indicia of society’s standards. Our Eighth Amendment case law is
now entirely inward looking.” Id. at 2490 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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culpability is far from a subjective assessment of proportionality based only on the
personal views of the Justices, an approach the Court has sought to avoid in its
deferential stance in reviewing adult non-capital sentencing. In the latter context,
no clear baseline guides the judgment of whether a particular sanction is excessive:
how long is too long? 71 But youths under the age of eighteen represent a
delineated category of criminal actors. Developmental research clarifies that the
factors that drive their criminal choices differentiate them from adult offenders.
This is not to deny that there is some overlap between the categories; some
juveniles may be indistinguishable from adults. But the attributes of adolescence
that distinguish juveniles from adults are not only verified through a solid and
growing body of research, they can also be linked to factors that have long been
sources of mitigation in criminal law doctrine. 72 Moreover, the conclusion that
juveniles, simply through maturation, are more likely to reform than adult
criminals is also supported by substantial research, providing an independent basis
for differential treatment under the Court’s capacious definition of the
justifications for punishment relevant to proportionality review. 73
The Court focused on three dimensions of adolescence that distinguish
juveniles from adult criminals and mitigate their blameworthiness. First, the Court
pointed to developmental influences that impair juveniles’ decision-making
capacities, including their “inability to assess consequences” 74 and the
“recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking” that contribute to an
“underdeveloped sense of responsibility.” 75 These factors mitigate the culpability
of youthful criminal choices under long-established doctrine.76 Second, mitigation
also applies to crimes committed in response to extraordinary external coercion.77
71

Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 299 (1983).
Laurence Steinberg and I have argued that the attributes of adolescence that make juveniles
less culpable than their adult counterparts constitute conventional sources of mitigation in criminal
law: diminished decisionmaking capacity; susceptibility to external coercion; and the absence of bad
character. The Court’s proportionality analysis was based on these features of adolescence, but it did
not explicitly link them to criminal law mitigation doctrine. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence
Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799 (2003); Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott,
Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and
the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014 (2003).
73
Criminal law theorists generally view proportionality as a retributive principle and favor
limiting punishment to that which the offender deserves, excluding consideration of the law’s
preventive purposes. Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA.
L. REV. 677, 732 (2005). The Court however has expanded the rationales for punishment, allowing
sentences to satisfy proportionality review if they can be justified on the basis of either retribution or
prevention. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1003 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (plurality
opinion).
74
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465.
75
Id. at 2464.
76
Courts have long recognized diminished decision making capacity based on age, mental
disability, or mental illness as mitigating factors. See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 72, at 826.
77
The defense of duress is a good example. Id. at 828.
72
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This is relevant to juvenile offending because, as the Court explained, adolescents
are vulnerable to negative pressures and influences, including peer influence, and
have limited control over their environment or ability to extricate themselves from
criminogenic settings. 78 Finally, the Court pointed to the unformed nature of
adolescent character, noting that, because much of a juvenile’s offending is the
product of “transient immaturity,” it is less likely than an adult’s criminal conduct
to be “evidence of irretrievable depravity.” 79 In many states, and under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, defendants can introduce mitigating evidence at sentencing
to demonstrate that their criminal activity was not the product of bad character. 80
In short, the Court’s conclusion that the harshest criminal sentences are actually or
presumptively excessive for juveniles was firmly grounded in conventional
criminal law doctrine—even though the Court did not explicitly link the key
youthful attributes to specific mitigation sources. Its proportionality analysis was
not based on the majority justices’ subjective paternalistic inclinations toward
youth.
The Court’s conclusion that juveniles should not be subject to the harshest
criminal sanctions was also based on its view that adolescents are more likely to
reform than their adult counterparts. That most youthful criminal activity is based
on “unfortunate yet transient immaturity” 81 is relevant to mitigation, as suggested
above. But this feature of juvenile offending also indicates that the law’s
preventive purposes are often poorly served by lengthy criminal sentences. Most
youths mature out of their tendency to get involved in criminal activity in early
adulthood and, as the Court noted, it is very difficult to distinguish a youth whose
crime follows this typical pattern from the uncommon young offender whose crime
represents “irreparable corruption.” 82 Thus sentencing a youth to LWOP cannot be
justified on public protection grounds. Little social benefit is likely to derive from
the sentence in most cases.
Both the retributive and preventive dimensions of the Court’s proportionality
analysis are supported by solid scientific research—not the typical judicial
78

Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464. Scott & Steinberg, supra note 72, at 818 (juveniles as legal
minors are not free to leave their families, neighborhoods, etc.).
79
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005).
80
With mitigating character evidence, defendants effectively seek to rebut the inference that
their criminal act was a product of bad character. Scott & Steinberg, supra note 72, at 827. Much
adolescent criminal activity is the product of developmental influences and not of bad character.
Personal identity is in flux in adolescence and doesn’t settle until early adulthood. Id. at 834.
81
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.
82
Roper, 543 U.S. at 573, quoted in Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010). The
Court in Roper points to the American Psychiatric Association Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
provides that the diagnosis of psychopathy cannot be made until age eighteen and concludes that “[i]f
trained psychiatrists with the advantage of clinical testing and observation refrain, despite diagnostic
expertise, from assessing any juvenile under 18 as having antisocial personality disorder, we
conclude that States should refrain from asking jurors to issue a far graver condemnation—that a
juvenile offender merits the death penalty.” Roper, 543 U.S. at 573.
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invocation of a few random studies to support a legal proposition. A large body of
behavioral research confirms that adolescents are more impulsive, risk-seeking,
subject to peer influence, and inclined to focus on the immediate consequences of
their choices than are adults. 83 Moreover, as the Court noted, the evidence that
adolescents are immature in ways that are relevant to their offending has become
even more robust since Roper. 84 A growing body of developmental neuroscience
research indicates that the areas of the brain that govern impulse control, planning,
and foresight of consequences mature slowly over the course of adolescence and
into early adulthood, while the arousal of the limbic system around puberty
increases sensation seeking in early adolescence. This research provides a
powerful hypothesis linking brain development to reckless antisocial behavior in
teenagers. 85 Moreover, many studies find a similar pattern of adolescent offending,
with the aggregate level of criminal involvement beginning at about age thirteen
and increasing until age seventeen, followed by a sharp decline. 86 This age-crime
trajectory confirms the transitory nature of most adolescent offending and supports
the Court’s judgment that juveniles are more likely to reform than their adult
counterparts.
In sum, the Court’s proportionality analysis in the juvenile cases provides a
sound basis for its rejection of harsh sentences as excessive. The analysis is based
not on conventional wisdom or “what any parent knows,” 87 but on developmental
science. A comprehensive body of research supports the Court’s conclusion that
juveniles as a group differ from adults in ways that mitigate culpability because
their offenses are driven by transitory developmental influences. The research,
however, does not indicate that every youth deserves mitigation. Accordingly,
individualized sentencing can be accommodated within the proportionality
framework (though at a risk of error, which—at least at this point—the Court is
ready to accept for youths convicted of murder). But the research justifies the
83

SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 130–39.
Miller pointed to the explosion in developmental neuroscience research post-Roper which
supported the analysis of both Roper and Graham about the diminished culpability of youth. Miller,
132 S. Ct. at 2464 n.5 (citing Brief for American Psychological Association et al. as Amici Curiae at
3).
85
One scientist described the gap between increases in sensation seeking in early adolescence
based on development in the brain’s limbic system and the later development of executive control
functions as “starting the engines with an unskilled driver.” Ronald Dahl, Affect Regulation, Brain
Development and Behavioral/Emotional Health in Adolescence, 6 CNS SPECTRUMS 1, 69 (2001); see
also Laurence Steinberg, Should the Science of Adolescent Brain Development Inform Public
Policy?, 64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 739 (2009) [hereinafter Adolescent Brain Development] (describing
dimensions of brain development relevant to criminal offending); see also Richard Bonnie &
Elizabeth Scott, The Teenage Brain: Adolescent Brain Research and the Law, in CURRENT
DIRECTIONS IN PSYCH. SCIENCE (2013).
86
Alex Piquero, David Farrington & Alfred Blumstein, The Criminal Career Paradigm:
Background and Recent Developments, 20 CRIME & JUST. 359 (Michael Tonry ed. 2003) (describing
the age-crime trajectory).
87
See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464–66 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569).
84
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Court’s approach of designating juveniles as a special category of offenders under
the Eighth Amendment, who presumptively should receive more lenient
punishment than adult criminals.
D. Graham and Miller and Eighth Amendment Doctrine: Two Competing Themes
Graham and Miller broke new ground in Eighth Amendment doctrine. At this
point, however, it is difficult to predict the scope of their influence—or whether
the Court will impose further constitutional limits on legislative authority to punish
juveniles as adults. Two related but distinct themes emerge in Graham and Miller:
the first theme is that for juveniles, LWOP is like the death penalty. The second is
that children are different. It is quite plausible that the Court, focusing on the first
theme, will limit the scope of special Eighth Amendment protection for young
offenders to restricting the sentence of LWOP. But if it takes the “children are
different” principle seriously, the opinions may have a broader influence on
constitutional doctrine.
The Court makes explicit the correspondence between LWOP and the death
penalty in both Graham and Miller. 88 LWOP represents a “forfeiture that is
irrevocable.” 89 Post-Roper, it is the most severe sentence a juvenile can receive.
Further, as Graham noted, juveniles serving LWOP effectively are subject to more
severe sentences than their adult counterparts because they are likely to spend
more time in prison. On the basis of the death-LWOP comparison, the Graham
Court categorically banned LWOP as disproportionate for nonhomicide offenses—
just as it had categorically excluded the death penalty for certain classes of
offenses and offenders. 90 In Miller, the Court prohibited the mandatory imposition
of LWOP on a juvenile offender and required that the decision be individualized so
that the defendant could introduce mitigating evidence—the same protections
afforded adult offenders facing a death sentence.91 Under a narrow interpretation
of Graham and Miller, the Court has simply extended the constitutional
protections that apply to the death penalty to the non-capital sentence of LWOP for
juveniles, because the two sentences are analogous for these young offenders. If
this is the meaning of Graham and Miller, the Court’s proportionality analysis may
be extended to other LWOP challenges, but not to other sentences or to other
special protections.
88
The Court emphasizes LWOP “share[s] some characteristics with death sentences that are
shared by no other sentences” and that “this lengthiest possible incarceration is an especially harsh
punishment for a juvenile because he will almost inevitably serve more years and a greater
percentage of his life in prison than an adult offender.” Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466 (quoting Graham
v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027 (2010)) (internal quotations omitted).
89
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027.
90
Graham represented the first time the Supreme Court categorically excluded a class of
offenders from a non-capital offense. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466–67.
91
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).
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But a second theme also clearly emerged in Miller: that juveniles are a special
category of offenders and that the attributes that make them different from adults
are relevant to criminal punishment. The Court distinguished the mandatory
sentence in Miller from a similar sentencing scheme for adults upheld in Harmelin
v. Michigan, 92 reminding skeptics that it had held “on multiple occasions that a
sentencing rule permissible for adults may not be so for children.” 93 In
announcing “if . . . death is different, children are different too” 94 under Eighth
Amendment doctrine, Miller offered a powerful principle with potentially farreaching impact. The Court’s insistence that its proportionality analysis was not
“crime-specific” is another strong statement that juvenile offending generally is
less culpable than that of adults—and not simply when they engage in criminal
conduct that carries a possible LWOP sentence. As Chief Justice Roberts
observed, “[t]he principle behind today’s decision seems to be only that because
juveniles are different from adults, they must be sentenced differently. There is no
clear reason that principle would not bar all mandatory sentences for juveniles, or
any juvenile sentence as harsh as what a similarly situated adult would receive.” 95
This is a fair reading of Miller, although it seems unlikely that the Court will
apply this principle as a constitutional constraint on sentencing juveniles as
broadly as Chief Justice Roberts fears. But the principle that “children [or
adolescents] are different” potentially has Eighth Amendment and other
constitutional implications that extend beyond LWOP. 96 It may be invoked to
challenge conditions of confinement,97 the lack of educational and other
developmentally important services in prison,98 and the failure to assure that
juveniles facing adult prosecution are competent to stand trial.99 But even beyond
its possible implications for expanding constitutional protections for juveniles,
92
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1006. (1991). The Court in Harmelin emphasized that
death was unlike “all other penalties.” Id. at 995.
93
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2470.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 2482 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
96
Marsha L. Levick & Elizabeth-Ann Tierney, The United States Supreme Court Adopts a
Reasonable Juvenile Standard in J.D.B. v. North Carolina for Purposes of the Miranda Custody
Analysis: Can a More Reasoned Justice System for Juveniles Be Far Behind?, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 501 (2012).
97
For example, the not-uncommon practice of putting juveniles in solitary confinement in
adult prisons (which is particularly harmful on developmental grounds for juveniles) could be
challenged on Eighth Amendment grounds. Teens in Solitary Confinement, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
(Oct. 10, 2012), http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/10/10/us-teens-solitary-confinement.
98
See JAMES AUSTIN, KELLY JOHNSON & MARIA GREGORIOU, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
JUVENILES IN ADULT PRISONS AND JAILS: A NATIONAL ASSESSMENT xi (2000) (finding “little evidence
of efforts to customize programs for youthful offenders.”).
99
See Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, Developmental Incompetence, Due Process, and
Juvenile Justice Policy, 83 N.C. L. REV. 793 (2005) (describing how developmental immaturity
affects youths’ competence to stand trial).

90

OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW

[Vol 11:1

Miller’s symbolic importance is hard to exaggerate. To be sure, the opinions affect
a relatively small number of offenders convicted of the most serious crimes. But
our highest legal institution has emphatically rejected the approach to juvenile
crime that dominated in the 1990s, when the relevance to criminal punishment of
differences between juvenile and adult offenders was either ignored or denied. As
I will show below, the principle announced by the Court, and the lessons amplified
in Miller are likely to reverberate through the justice system and to profoundly
influence other lawmakers.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS FOR JUVENILE CRIME POLICY
The Supreme Court opinions rejecting harsh sentences for juveniles will not
be universally embraced, of course, but they are not likely to be highly
controversial in the contemporary political climate surrounding youth crime
regulation. Indeed, the constitutional values that animated the opinions and the
perspective the Court adopted can be discerned in contemporary political discourse
on youth crime, and seem to be taking hold among lawmakers. The Court’s Eighth
Amendment opinions have imbued an emerging perspective on juvenile crime with
constitutional significance, elevating its likely impact in the policy arena. But this
perspective stands in sharp contrast to the view of teenage crime regulation that
prevailed in the 1990s. Thus, the Supreme Court opinions are important in part
because they so clearly repudiate the attitudes and policies of this relatively recent
period.
In this Part, I will show that together with the general expressive importance
of the Court’s pronouncements as an influence on justice policy, four important
and discrete lessons can be derived from the opinions: the first lesson is embodied
in the principle that Chief Justice Roberts laments 100—that adolescents are less
culpable than adult offenders and presumptively should not be subject to the same
punishment for their crimes. This principle challenges laws enacted in the 1990s
that facilitated adult prosecution and punishment of juveniles. The second lesson,
derived from Miller, provides guidance for regulating decisions about which
youths should be eligible for adult prosecution and the process for making that
determination. Traditional laws mandating an individualized transfer hearing in
which the youth has a meaningful opportunity to present evidence of his
immaturity are more compatible with constitutional values than recently enacted
statutes that automatically transfer youths charged with serious crimes or give
prosecutors broad discretion to try juveniles as adults. 101 Third, the Court’s
insistence that juveniles have greater potential for reform than do adult offenders
100

See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2482 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting).
In New York, a thirteen-year-old charged with murder is defined as an adult and excluded from
juvenile court jurisdiction. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 30.00 (McKinney 1994); see also, NAT’L. CENTER FOR JUV. JUST.,
http://www.ncjj.org/Research_Resources/State_Profiles.aspx (listing states with automatic transfer and direct file
statutes).
101
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offers constitutional support for a regime of dispositions that facilitate the
development of juvenile offenders into non-criminal adults. And fourth, the
opinions underscore that juvenile crime policy is appropriately grounded in
developmental science, including neurobiological research on brain
development—indeed, developmental knowledge reinforces the other three
lessons.
The lessons grounded in the recent Supreme Court opinions may resonate
with many lawmakers in the contemporary political climate, but they represent a
repudiation of the juvenile justice regime that took hold in the late twentieth
century.
In the 1990s, public fear and anger directed toward young
“superpredators” fueled moral panics in response to juvenile crime. 102 Politicians
intent on protecting the public from the threat pushed urgently for tough laws,
rejecting the traditional rehabilitative model of juvenile justice as well as the idea
that adolescents were different from adults in any way relevant to the justice
system’s response to their crimes. Law reforms in almost every state facilitated
adult prosecution and punishment of juveniles, often through automatic transfer
statutes that categorically classified youths charged with particular serious crimes
as adults. 103 The mantra of that period might well have been, “children are not
different”—at least when it comes to criminal prosecution and punishment. 104
The moral panics of the 1990s have subsided, and in recent years a more
deliberative approach to juvenile crime has emerged. The change in attitude in
part represents a pragmatic recognition that imprisonment of juveniles is costly and
often less effective at reducing crime than developmentally-based correctional
programs. 105 Concern about the fairness of punishing juveniles as adults has also
created uneasiness with incarceration-based policies, especially because minority
youths are far more likely to receive harsh sentences. In the past decade,
developmental neuroscience research has captured public attention, persuading
many that immature adolescent brains contribute to teenage criminal activity. 106
These factors have converged to create a political environment that is receptive to
the lessons offered by the Supreme Court in the juvenile opinions.
102
See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 95–96 for a discussion of the 1990s response to
juvenile crime. The term ‘superpredator’ was coined by John DiIulio, who predicted a wave of
violent crime committed by youths growing up in moral poverty. John J. DiIulio, Jr., The Coming of
the Superpredators, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, Nov. 27, 1995.
103
See supra note 101. Indeed, it was this expansion of transfer to adult court that resulted in
many youths facing LWOP sentences under statutes such as those rejected in Graham and Miller.
For a discussion of the reforms, see SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 96–99.
104
In fact, the slogan “adult time for adult crime” was often invoked by punitive reformers.
An early advocate of tough reforms, Alfred Regnery, head of the Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention under President Reagan, noted, “[T]here is no reason for punishing an
offender less simply because he is sixteen.” Getting Away with Murder: Why the Juvenile Justice
System Needs an Overhaul, 34 POL’Y REV. 65, 68 (1987).
105
See generally SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 184–91.
106
Steinberg, supra note 85; Bonnie & Scott, supra note 85; SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 5
at 184–91.
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This Part first sets the stage with a brief history of juvenile crime regulation
over the past generation and then examines the four lessons offered by the Court.
In combination, these lessons provide a template for fair and effective juvenile
crime policy. The three Supreme Court opinions provide a solid foundation for a
developmental model of juvenile crime regulation based on the premise that
adolescents are different from adults in ways that mitigate culpability and that
young offenders have a greater potential to reform.
A. Juvenile Crime Regulation in Flux
What follows is a brief history of a tumultuous period in juvenile crime
policy. It begins with a description of the moral panics and the resulting punitive
law reforms that transformed juvenile crime policy in the 1990s. It then describes
factors that have led many policymakers to rethink this approach and have
contributed to a climate more receptive to a regulatory approach that recognizes
the differences between juveniles and adults. In this setting, the impact of the
lessons offered by the Supreme Court is likely to be amplified.
1. Law Reform as Moral Panic
The legal and policy changes of the 1990s began in response to a legitimate
concern: an increase in violent youth crime in the late 1980s. 107 Public alarm
about this threat was reinforced by a widespread perception that the traditional
juvenile justice system with its emphasis on rehabilitation was ineffective at
dealing with violent youths and that tougher laws were needed. 108 As the media
intensified its focus on juvenile crime and politicians responded with promises to
protect the public, perceptions about the seriousness of the threat escalated and
young criminals were demonized as predators; they came to be seen as the enemies
of society. 109 Although high profile crimes by juveniles such as school shootings
and the killing of innocent bystanders by juvenile gangs were rare occurrences,
public alarm was fueled by media attention and exploited by politicians.
Consequently, these incidents came to be seen as evidence of an epidemic of youth

107
See generally SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 96–99; FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING,
AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE (1998).
108
In one study, seventy percent of those questioned believed that leniency in the juvenile
justice system contributed to violent youth crime. SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS
(Kathleen Maguire & Timothy J. Flanagan eds., 1990). See also Jane B. Sprott, Understanding
Public Opposition to a Separate Juvenile System, 44 CRIME & DELINQ. 399 (1998) (survey finding
support for view that juvenile system’s laxness encouraged youth crime).
109
See, e.g., Editorial, Heading Off the Superpredators, TAMPA TRIB., May 21, 1996, at 8
(“They are called suprepredators. They are not here yet but they are predicted to be a plague upon
the United States in the next decade.”).
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violence. 110 In general, perceptions of the threat posed by young offenders became
greatly exaggerated, with surveys indicating that the public erroneously thought
that juveniles were responsible for most violent crime. 111 The perception that
juvenile crime was on the rise and that an even greater threat loomed in the future
only increased the sense of urgency; this perception persisted long after crime rates
began a steady decline in 1994. 112 Protecting the public from teenage predators
became an urgent priority for politicians, prosecutors and judges.
This was the social and political setting for sweeping law reforms that
fundamentally altered youth crime regulation in almost every state. During this
period, legislatures greatly expanded criminal court jurisdiction over young
offenders in several ways. Judicial transfer laws were amended to allow adult
prosecution of younger juveniles and the range of transfer-eligible crimes was
greatly expanded to include less serious felonies, including property and drug
offenses. 113 Two other reforms enacted by many state legislatures have had an
even greater impact. First, automatic transfer statutes that set the jurisdictional age
below the age of eighteen have excluded teenagers from juvenile court jurisdiction,
either categorically (in states in which the general jurisdictional age is sixteen or
seventeen) or when charged with particular felonies. 114 Estimates indicate that
250,000 youths under the age of eighteen are prosecuted and punished as adults
under these statutes, half for non-violent crimes. 115 Second, in response to

110
See, e.g., Rod Nordland, Deadly Lessons, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 9, 1992; Eloise Salholz, How
to Keep Kids Safe, NEWSEEK, Mar. 9, 1992, at 30.
111
A 1996 survey of 1,000 likely California voters found that sixty percent of respondents
believed that juveniles were responsible for most violent crime. In reality, only fourteen percent of
arrests for violent crimes involved juveniles. See Lori Dorfman & Vincent Schiraldi, Off Balance:
Youth, Race & Crime in the News, BUILDING BLOCKS FOR YOUTH at 3–4, 40 n.10 (2001), available at
www.cclp.org/documents/BBY/offbalance.pdf (describing results of study).
112
See Scott & Grisso, supra note 99 (discussing the popular prediction of a coming wave of
“superpredators”).
113
In California today, youths age fourteen and older can be transferred for thirty offenses,
including minor drug selling. CAL. WELF. AND INSTIT. CODE § 707 (West 2011). Under traditional
law, transfer was rare and in most states, was reserved for teens age sixteen and older charged with
serious violent crimes (e.g. murder, rape, kidnapping, aggravated assault). SCOTT & STEINBERG,
supra note 5, at 98.
114
For example, in Illinois, a fifteen year old charged with drug distribution near a school was
treated as an adult. (This statute was repealed in 2005.) In two states (New York and North
Carolina), the maximum age of juvenile court jurisdiction is age fifteen and in ten states, the maximum age is
sixteen. NAT’L. CENTER FOR JUV. JUST., JUVENILE TRANSFER TO CRIMINAL COURT PROVISIONS BY STATE,
available at http://www.ncjj.org/Research_Resources/State_Profiles.aspx. Richard Redding lists thirty-one
states with automatic transfer statutes for some offenses in 2003. Richard E. Redding, Juvenile Transfer
Laws: An Effective Deterrent to Delinquency?, OJJDP JUV. JUST. BULL. Jun. 2010, available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/220595.pdf.
115
SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 4; CHARLES PUZZANCHERA, ET AL., OFF. JUV. JUST. &
DEL. PREVENTION, JUVENILE COURT STATISTICS 2000, (2004) (citing statistics); In New York alone,
almost 45,873 sixteen and seventeen year old youths were charged as adults in 2010. Mosi Secret, New
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dissatisfaction with juvenile court judges, who were perceived to be too lenient,
many states passed “direct-file” statutes that give prosecutors the authority to
decide whether a youth charged with a serious crime should be dealt with as an
adult or as a juvenile. 116 Under both automatic transfer and direct file laws, the
jurisdictional question is no longer made in an individualized transfer hearing in
which the youth’s immaturity is considered. The reforms of the 1990s also had an
impact on the operation of the juvenile system: dispositions became much harsher
as incarceration became the norm for many youths who once would have received
community sanctions. 117 In general, these legal reforms blurred the jurisdictional
and functional boundaries between the juvenile and adult justice systems and they
resulted in harsher criminal sanctions for many juveniles. 118
The hostility and fear that characterized attitudes toward young offenders in
the 1990s resulted in policies and decisions driven primarily by immediate public
safety concerns and the goal of punishing young criminals. In this pressured
environment, decisionmakers seldom considered the long term consequences of
their choices, including the impact of imprisonment on recidivism and on the
future trajectories of young offenders’ lives. Moreover, values that would be
deemed important to the legitimacy of the justice system in ordinary times got little
attention—such as the disproportionate imposition of harsh sentences on minority
youths or the fairness of subjecting teenagers to adult sentences. 119 The core
assumption of the traditional model of juvenile justice—that young offenders were
different from their adult counterparts and should receive different treatment—was
largely dismissed. 120

York Judge Seeks New System for Juveniles, N.Y. TIMES, (Sept. 20, 2011), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/21/nyregion/new-yorks-chief-judge-seeks-new-system-for-juveniledefendants.html.
116
NATIONAL OVERVIEWS, NAT’L. CENTER FOR JUV. JUST., available at http://www.ncjj.org;
PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., OFFICE OF JUV. JUST. &DELINQ. PRESERVATION, STATE RESPONSES TO
SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME (1996), available at ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/statresp.pdf
[hereinafter State Responses].
117
See STEVE AOS, WASH. STATE INSTIT. FOR PUB. POL’Y, The Juvenile Justice System in
Washington State: Recommendations to Improve Cost-Effectiveness 3 (Oct. 2002), available at
http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/pub.asp?docid=02-10-1201 (describing increased use of incarceration in
Washington state).
118
For a general overview of the trend toward more punitive policies toward juveniles charged
with violent crimes in the early 1990s, see TORBET ET AL., supra note 116, at 4.
119
Substantial racial disparities begin with police contact. Minority youths are far more likely
than white youths to be apprehended. See, e.g., DAVID HUIZINGA, TERENCE THORNBERRY, KELLY
KNIGHT & PETER LOVEGROVE, DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONTACT IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE
SYSTEM: A STUDY OF DIFFERENTIAL MINORITY ARREST/REFERRAL TO COURT IN THREE CITIES, (2007),
available at http://www.ojjdp.gov/dmc/ (finding “clear evidence” of disproportionate minority
contact with police).
120
See Regnery, supra note 104 (expressing view that age of young offenders is irrelevant to
criminal punishment).

2013

“CHILDREN ARE DIFFERENT”

95

2. A Twenty-First Century Perspective on Juvenile Crime
During the past decade, the tone of discourse about juvenile crime has
changed and a different regulatory approach has begun to take hold. In part, this is
because the moral panics of the 1990s subsided as the public gradually (and
belatedly) recognized that juvenile crime was less of a threat than it had seemed to
be. 121 Lawmakers also began to recognize that incarceration-based policies were
costly; their budgetary impact became more burdensome with the severe recession
in 2008. Just as importantly, policymakers have come to realize that incarcerating
young offenders likely contributes to a high rate of reoffending, while some
developmentally-based community programs have been shown to be very effective
at reducing recidivism. 122 Since reducing crime through cost effective sanctions is
a key goal of any criminal justice policy, over time these long-term practical
considerations have dampened lawmakers’ enthusiasm for harsh juvenile
sentences.
At the heart of this change in attitude is a growing tendency among
lawmakers and the public to accept (once again) that young offenders are different
from adults. In part, this may be simply a resurfacing of traditional paternalistic
attitudes toward youth that were submerged in the 1990s. But contemporary
attitudes increasingly have been influenced by a body of developmental research
that offers a far more sophisticated account of differences between adolescents and
adults than was available in an earlier era. In particular, public and media interest
has focused on neuroscience studies suggesting that immaturity in the brain’s
executive functions during adolescence may affect teenagers’ decisions about
involvement in criminal activity. 123 This research seems to have been influential in

121
Violent juvenile crime rates began a steady decade-long decline in 1994. Rates declined for other
crimes shortly thereafter. See OFF. OF JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, Juvenile Arrest Rate Trends (Dec. 17,
2012), available at http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/crime/JAR_Display.asp?ID=qa05200 (“The juvenile
arrest rate for all offenses reached its highest level in the last two decades in 1996, and then declined
thirty-six percent by 2009.”); Charles Puzzanchera, OJJDP JUV. JUST. BULLETIN, Juvenile Arrests
2008, (Dec. 2009), available at www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/228479.pdf (describing declining rates
for specific offenses).
122
In 2009, a New York Task Force appointed by Governor Patterson issued a scathing
critique of that state’s juvenile justice system, pointing to the high recidivism rate among youths sent
to institutional facilities. The report urged the use of evidence based community programs. TASK
FORCE ON TRANSFORMING JUV. JUST., CHARTING A NEW COURSE: A BLUEPRINT FOR TRANSFORMING
JUVENILE JUSTICE IN NEW YORK STATE (2009) [hereinafter CHARTING A NEW COURSE]. See also
SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 217–20, for a discussion of successful programs.
123
See e.g., Sharon Begley, Getting Inside a Teenage Brain, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 28, 2000, at 58; Claudia
Wallis, What Makes Teens Tick?, TIME, Sept. 26, 2008, at 56; Malcolm Ritter, Experts Link Teen Brains’
Immaturity,
Juvenile
Crime, USA
TODAY,
Dec.
2,
2007, available
at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/science/2007-12-02-teenbrains_N.htm.
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changing attitudes about young offenders; it has been invoked in support of a
broad range of policies dealing more leniently with juvenile offenders. 124
The recognition that much juvenile offending differs from adult criminal
activity in that it is driven by developmental immaturity challenges the punitive
approach to juvenile crime in two ways. First, it supports the pragmatic critique of
incarceration-based policies described above. Policymakers favoring a shift in
resources from institutions to community-based programs have pointed to the
particular harms to adolescents of imprisonment and to the greater effectiveness of
developmentally appropriate correctional dispositions. 125 But accepting that
teenagers are immature in ways that influence their criminal choices also
challenges the fairness of prosecuting and punishing them as adults. While
politicians in the 1990s dismissed the notion that adult punishment was
disproportionate for juveniles, this concern has generated increased uneasiness in
recent years. On occasion, the public has responded with sympathy to young
offenders serving long sentences, leading to the moderation of harsh laws. In
Colorado, for example, a series of news stories about youths serving LWOP
sentences stirred opposition to this sentence; in response, the legislature abolished
the sentence for juveniles altogether (even before the Supreme Court). 126 Fairness
concerns have also become acute when the disproportionate impact of tough
policies on minority youths is recognized. Thus, Illinois repealed a statute
automatically transferring fifteen-year-olds charged with selling drugs near schools
in the face of evidence that the statute was applied overwhelmingly against African
American youths. 127 In short, two themes characterize the recent dissatisfaction
with the justice policies of the late twentieth century—harsh criminal sentences
imposed on juveniles represent disproportionate punishment, and they also are
ineffective in furthering the long term goal of crime reduction. Both responses are
based on the recognition that adolescents are different from adults.
124

For an overview, see SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 266–68; Bonnie & Scott, supra

note 85.
125

The 2009 New York Governor’s Task Force report emphasized the high cost of
institutionalizing youths ($210,000 per year, per youth), the majority of whom were misdemeanants,
and their very high recidivism rates. The system’s punitive approach, it stated, “damaged the future
prospects of these young people, wasted millions of taxpayer dollars, and violated the fundamental principles
of positive youth development.” CHARTING A NEW COURSE, supra note 122, at 8. New York City officials
responded by announcing a drastic reduction in the number of city youths sent to state institutions. Julie
Bosman, City Signals Intent to Put Fewer Teenagers in Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2010, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/nyregion/21juvenile.html?ref=nyregion&pagewanted=print (describing
a cost of $17,000 per youth for community program).
126
See Gwen Florio, Sue Lindsey & Sarah Langbein, Life for Death: Should Teen Murderers
get a Second Chance at Freedom?, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Sept. 17, 2005, at 1A. Governor Bill Owen
pointed to brain research in explaining his support. Miles Moffeit & Kevin Simpson, Research
Points to Changing Teen Brain, DENVER POST, Feb. 19, 2006, at A1; Miles Moffeit, Juvenile Justice
Legislation a Milestone in Sentencing, DENVER POST, May 28, 2006.
127
MARY SCHMID, NATIONAL JUVENILE DEFENDER CENTER, 2005 STATE JUVENILE JUSTICE
LEGISLATION (Nov. 2005), available at http://njdc.info/publications.php.
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It would be an exaggeration to suggest that attitudes toward juvenile crime
have been transformed in recent years or that lawmakers have retreated
dramatically from the punitive model of regulation that dominated in the 1990s.
The shifts in attitude and policy have been modest and gradual; many laws enacted
in the 1990s remain on the books. But teenage lawbreakers are no longer labeled
as superpredators in the political arena. Over the past decade, hostility toward
young criminals has dissipated substantially, producing a climate in which
lawmakers have been more inclined to deliberate and to consider long term goals
and values as well as immediate concerns. In this environment, policymakers have
adopted a more pragmatic and less punitive approach to juvenile crime regulation.
B. Four Lessons for Youth Crime Policy
These political and policy changes provide the backdrop for the Supreme
Court’s consideration of whether the imposition of harsh criminal sentences on
juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. The opinions discussed in this essay, with their emphasis on how
distinctive features of adolescence are important to the legal response to youthful
offending, embody a twenty-first century understanding of juvenile crime. In this
way, the Court has effectively reinforced and strengthened the emerging legal
trend and provided four key lessons for its future direction.
1. Lesson One: Fair Punishment and Proportionality
The first and broadest lesson offered by the Court is embodied in the
mitigation principle lamented by Chief Justice Roberts in his Miller dissent—that
juvenile offenders, due to their developmental immaturity, are less culpable than
their adult counterparts and (usually) should be sentenced more leniently for their
criminal offenses. The Court recognized that proportionality is essential to a
constitutionally legitimate justice system and rejected sentences that are excessive
on the basis of juveniles’ reduced culpability. Moreover, the Court emphasized
that this reduced culpability applies generally to juveniles’ criminal offenses,
implying that mitigation should broadly inform youth crime regulation. I have
argued that the mitigation principle embraced by the Court is solidly grounded in
the attributes of adolescence that distinguish youthful offending from that of adults
and that correspond to various sources of mitigation in criminal law. In short, the
first lesson is that a legitimate and fair justice system recognizes the reduced
blameworthiness of this group of offenders and punishes them less severely than
adults.
The Court, in announcing that “children are different” and creating a special
Eighth Amendment status for juveniles, implicitly rebuked law reformers of the
1980s and 1990s who insisted that there was no reason that young offenders should
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receive more lenient punishment than adults. 128 Indeed, in the hostile climate that
surrounded youth crime during that period, teenage predators were depicted as
more culpable and certainly more dangerous than adult criminals. 129 As
legislatures executed sweeping legal changes that greatly expanded criminal court
jurisdiction over juveniles, little (if any) attention was directed at whether adult
sentences were excessive for juveniles. Conventional criminal law theory holds
that proportionate punishment should be based on the seriousness of the harm but
also on the blameworthiness of the criminal actor.130 But the punitive reformers
assumed that juveniles—like typical adult offenders—were sufficiently
blameworthy to be punished solely on the basis of the harms of their offenses. By
focusing on traits of young offenders that reduce their culpability, the Supreme
Court rejected this assumption and the incomplete proportionality analysis on
which it implicitly rested.
Although the first lesson—that juveniles presumptively should be punished
more leniently than their adult counterparts—is unlikely to be fully entrenched in
constitutional doctrine, it embodies constitutional values that can shape justice
policy and practice in several ways. First, the mitigation principle supplies a
rationale for retaining most juveniles in a separate justice system that
systematically deals with offenders within its jurisdiction more leniently than does
the criminal justice system. Traditionally, the juvenile and criminal systems were
distinguished in part on the basis of the severity of sanctions in the two regimes—
and this distinction continues to justify retaining a clear boundary between them. 131
The Court’s proportionality analysis also supports a regime in which adult
prosecution and punishment are “uncommon.” Further, because (as the Court
noted) the conclusion that a youth can fairly be subject to adult criminal
punishment is subject to a high risk of error, 132 juveniles convicted in adult court
presumptively should receive reduced sentences as compared to their adult
counterparts. In theory, as Barry Feld has argued, proportionality values could be
served in a unitary system in which youths were adjudicated in criminal court, but
received a “youth discount” in sentencing in recognition of their reduced
128

See Regnery, supra note 104.
See DiIulio, supra note 102 (describing “superpredators”).
130
For a discussion of the importance of the proportionality principle to criminal punishment,
see RICHARD BONNIE, ANNE COUGHLIN, JOHN JEFFRIES & PETER LOW, CRIMINAL LAW 901–58 (2004).
131
Of course, the leniency of the traditional juvenile court generated much criticism in the late
twentieth century, see MAQUIRE & FLANAGAN, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra
note 108, but this may have been because leniency was excessive or other justice system goals such
as public protection and crime reduction received inadequate attention.
132
The Court noted this high risk of error in distinguishing the youth whose crime is a product
of immaturity from one who is “incorrigible” in categorically prohibiting the imposition of the death
penalty and LWOP for nonhomicide offenses on juveniles. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2029
(2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572 (2005). See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 72, at 826
(discussing this challenge).
129
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culpability. 133 But such a regime cannot be justified because it fails to serve other
justice system values and goals, such as crime prevention. 134 Instead, only a small
category of juveniles should be eligible for adult prosecution and, as indicated
below, the judgment should be made on an individualized basis.
2. Lesson Two: Transfer and Eligibility for Adult Prosecution
The Court’s second lesson for policymakers builds on the first: given that
juveniles are presumptively less culpable than their adult counterparts, the decision
about whether a particular youth will be tried as an adult should be made in a way
that is compatible with constitutional values. Nothing in the Court’s approach to
the sentencing of juveniles supports excluding all juveniles from the criminal
justice system. Indeed, the offenders in Roper, Graham, and Miller whose
sentences were struck by the Court were imprisoned as adults, and most continued
to serve prison terms after the decisions. But the lesson of these opinions for
policymakers is that only youths charged with the most harmful felonies should be
eligible for criminal court jurisdiction and that the decision should be made in an
individualized hearing in which the court can consider the youth’s immaturity and
other mitigating factors.
This lesson is based on the distinction the Court draws between homicide and
nonhomicide offenses in Graham and Miller and its insistence on individualized
consideration of mitigation as a condition of imposing LWOP even for homicide.
In prohibiting LWOP for nonhomicide offenses committed by juveniles, Graham
emphasized both the generally reduced culpability of juveniles and the lesser harm
of nonhomicide offenses. On these grounds, the Court excluded these offenses
categorically from eligibility for the harsh sentence of LWOP. In contrast, Miller
allowed the sentence of LWOP for murder because of the severe harm caused by
the crime, but only on the basis of an individualized hearing to determine that the
juvenile is sufficiently “corrupt” to warrant the sentence. Thus the Court
recognized not only that certain crimes (murder) deserve more punishment than
others because of the harm inflicted, but also that even those youths who have
caused great harm usually will not deserve the same punishment as adults and
should not be categorically subject to the same sanctions.
This framework can be applied more generally to regulate the transfer of
juveniles to adult court. It argues for excluding juveniles from criminal court
jurisdiction for all but the most harmful felonies: those that involve serious
133
BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE COURT 315–
28 (1999) (arguing for a unitary system).
134
See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 226–29 (critiquing the unitary system and
advocating for a separate juvenile justice system). A unitary system is unlikely to provide young
offenders with programs and services needed to maximize the likelihood that they will make the
transition to non-criminal adulthood. The staff, setting, and programs in a separate juvenile system
are more likely to provide a healthy developmental setting. See infra notes 146–51 and
accompanying text.
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physical violence. It also supports a regime in which the decision to adjudicate a
juvenile as an adult is made by a judge in an individualized transfer hearing. 135
Laws adopted in the late twentieth century to redefine the jurisdictional
boundary between juvenile and criminal court are not compatible with the Court’s
framework or the constitutional values on which it rests. During this period, as
discussed above, statutory reforms greatly expanded the list of transfer-eligible
crimes to include many non-violent offenses. 136 Statistics indicate that about half
of youths in adult prisons are serving time for property or drug offenses. 137
Moreover, automatic transfer and direct file statutes eliminated any judicial
determination that adult adjudication is appropriate for particular youths. These
laws dramatically shift discretionary authority to make jurisdictional decisions
from judges to prosecutors who are far less likely to consider youthful immaturity
or other mitigating circumstances. 138 Finally, the general reduction in the
minimum age of transfer 139 has increased the likelihood that immature and less
culpable youths will face adult prosecution, an outcome that is offensive to the
constitutional principle of proportionality.
The Supreme Court’s framework for protecting youths whose crimes and/or
immaturity do not warrant harsh criminal punishment supports a regulatory
approach similar to the traditional transfer regime that regulated decisions about
criminal court adjudication of juveniles in most states for much of the twentieth
century. 140 Under these statutes, transfer typically was limited to older juveniles
charged with serious violent offenses. The decision was made by a judge in a
hearing in which the court considered evidence of immaturity and other factors
such as the youth’s amenability to treatment as a juvenile, his criminal record, and
the circumstances of (and his role in) the crime. 141 Only on the basis of this
deliberative process was a juvenile transferred to criminal court to be tried as an
adult. This statutory model can guide modern lawmakers in designing a transfer
process compatible with the constitutional values embedded in the Court’s recent
juvenile sentencing opinions.
135

In Kent v. United States, the Supreme Court found that juveniles were entitled to a waiver
hearing before they were transferred to criminal court. The Court was interpreting the District of
Columbia statute, but the language of the opinion suggested that the waiver decision implicated
constitutional interests. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
136
For example, in California, youths age fourteen and older can be transferred for thirty
offenses, including minor drug selling. CAL. WELF. AND INSTIT. CODE § 707 (West 2011).
137
SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 98.
138
NAT’L. CENTER FOR JUV. JUST., STATE JUVENILE JUSTICE PROFILES: NATIONAL OVERVIEWS,
available at http:www.ncjj.org; TORBET ET AL., supra note 115.
139
SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 345 n.33.
140
See generally id. at 84 (describing the traditional juvenile court prior to the punitive
reforms of the 1990s).
141
See Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile Justice Law
Reform, 79 MINN. L. REV. 965, 1006–09 (1995).
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3. Lesson Three: Juveniles’ Potential to Reform
As discussed above, the Court bolstered its retributive analysis of LWOP as
an excessive sentence for juveniles with a preventive rationale—that young
offenders have a greater potential to reform than their adult counterparts and that
LWOP affords them no opportunity for rehabilitation.142 The importance assigned
to the potential of youths to desist and reform points to a third important lesson for
justice policy: as the Court emphasizes, most juveniles who engage in criminal
activity are not “incorrigible” (i.e., they are not on an inexorable course to a life of
criminality). Their criminal activity is driven by factors associated with
adolescence as a developmental stage. As youths mature, these developmental
influences on decisionmaking diminish and the capacity for self control improves.
As the Court explained in Miller, “as . . . neurological development occurs, [the
young offender’s] deficiencies will be reformed.” 143 Thus, most juveniles are
likely to desist from offending as they mature into adulthood 144—unless the justice
system pushes them in the direction of a criminal career. For this reason, society
has an interest in responding to juvenile crime through interventions that maximize
the likelihood that young offenders will actually mature into non-criminal adults.
An effective justice policy will provide dispositional settings and programs for
juveniles that promote healthy maturation during adolescence.
In emphasizing the potential of young criminals to reform as they mature, the
Court again implicitly rejected policies adopted in the 1990s that aimed to promote
public safety by incarcerating young criminals in prisons and institutional juvenile
facilities. Punitive reformers either did not understand the transitory nature of
most youthful offending or did not draw the clear policy lesson that correctional
settings matter if crime reduction is an important goal. Considerable evidence
indicates that institutions are harmful developmental settings due to a combination
of features: large size, impersonal relationships between inmates and adult staff, 145

142
See supra note 73 (explaining the Court’s position that a sentence can be justified as not
disproportionate if it serves other purposes of criminal punishment such as deterrence, incapacitation,
or rehabilitation). Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(plurality opinion).
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Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012) (internal quotations omitted).
144
Piquero et. al., supra note 86, at 359 (between five and ten percent become adult career
criminals).
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Staff in prisons and institutional facilities are unlikely to function as positive adult role
models. They typically perform custodial functions, maintaining distant, authoritarian, and generally
hostile relationships with inmates. Martin Forst, Jeffrey Fagan & T. Scott Vivona, Youths in Prisons
and Training Schools: Perceptions and Consequences of the Treatment-Custody Dichotomy, 40 JUV.
& FAM. CT. J. 1 (1989); Donna Bishop & Charles Frazier, Consequences of Transfer, in THE
CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 227 (Jeffrey Fagan & Frank Zimring eds., 2000)
(describing staff-inmate relationships in prisons).
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unstructured interactions with fellow inmates,146 and inadequate educational,
mental health, and occupational programs. 147 These facilities do little to provide
adolescents with the structures and services necessary to enable them to make the
transition to the conventional roles of adult life. 148 Lawmakers in the late twentieth
century focused intently on the immediate threat posed by young criminals and
paid little attention to the long term consequences of imprisonment on juveniles’
lives, or perhaps they erroneously assumed that most young offenders were
incipient career criminals. Further, the 1990s’ reforms swept into secure facilities
many youths whose crimes involved no violence and who posed little threat to
public safety. 149 Not surprisingly, recidivism rates among these juveniles were
(and are) high. 150
Contemporary policy makers have begun to understand that much teenage
crime is driven by developmental influences, and to embrace the lesson that justice
policy should attend to juvenile offenders’ potential for reform. Incarcerationbased policies have been subject to harsh criticism lately because they are costly,
ineffective at reducing reoffending, and destructive of young offenders’ future
lives. 151 Across the country, regulators have shifted resources from state
institutions to evidence-based community programs that have been shown to be far
more effective than institutional placement at reducing reoffending. 152 These
programs incorporate developmental knowledge to create social contexts that
facilitate healthy maturation in adolescence by seeking to build relationships with
authoritative parents or other adults, minimize the influence of antisocial peers,

146
In most adult facilities, youths have frequent contact with older prisoners, who may teach
them criminal strategies or victimize them. JAMES AUSTIN, KELLY JOHNSON & MARIA GREGORIOU,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. JUVENILES IN ADULT PRISONS AND JAILS: A NATIONAL ASSESSMENT (2000)
(juvenile and adult prisoners separated in thirteen percent of facilities). In some youth prisons,
juveniles confined for minor crimes mix freely with serious chronic offenders. CHARTING A NEW
COURSE, supra note 122, at 19, 47 (describing misdemeanants and violent youths mixed in
institutional facilities).
147
Id. at 57–62.
148
Indeed institutional incarceration may be more aversive for adolescents than for older
prisoners because teenagers are in a formative developmental stage.
149
See, e.g., HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, OFF. OF JUV. DELINQ. PREVENTION,
JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 1999 NATIONAL REPORT115 (fifty percent of youths in prison
convicted of property and drug offenses).
150
CHARTING A NEW COURSE, supra note 122.
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Id.
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Among the most successful programs are Multi-Systemic Therapy, Functional Family
Therapy, and Therapeutic Foster Care. See discussion of these programs, how they function to
provide healthy social contexts and their effectiveness in SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 15, at 215–
21; see also STEVE AOS, MARNA MILLER & ELIZABETH DRAKE, EVIDENCE- BASED PUBLIC POLICY
OPTIONS TO REDUCE FUTURE PRISON CONSTRUCTION, CRIMINAL JUSTICE COSTS, AND CRIME RATES
(2006), available at http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/06-10-1201.pdf (showing cost effectiveness of
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and provide appropriate training and educational services. 153 Contemporary
lawmakers increasingly recognize that juveniles have the “potential to reform,”
and that prison sentences may be counterproductive in furthering society’s goal of
reducing crime.
The Supreme Court’s emphasis on the transitory nature of much juvenile
offending reflects an understanding of youth crime that aligns with (and has
probably influenced) that of contemporary regulators. This understanding in turn
tracks scientific knowledge about the pattern of criminal involvement in
adolescence and theories about its causes. Clear policy implications follow from
the recognition that much youthful offending is driven by developmental
influences. The Court has not drawn out these implications through specific policy
proposals, of course. But in emphasizing the potential of the young offender to
reform and rejecting LWOP as offensive to the Eighth Amendment for failing to
provide that opportunity, while “mak[ing] an irrevocable judgment about that
person’s value,” 154 the Court lent moral authority to a correctional approach that
assumes that reform is a key policy goal and aims to maximize young criminals’
prospects for non-criminal adulthood. The Court’s endorsement has underscored
the superiority of this approach and bolstered it as the path forward on both
pragmatic and moral grounds.
4. Lesson Four: Developmental Science and Juvenile Crime Policy
The last lesson offered by the Court in the juvenile sentencing cases overlaps
with and informs the first three lessons. The opinions clarify that developmental
science can play an important role in informing the legal response to youth crime.
Developmental psychology and neuroscience references were not window dressing
in the Court’s analysis. The scientifically informed account of adolescent
offending is at the heart of its proportionality analysis and it is the primary basis
for rejecting the death penalty and LWOP as excessive punishment for juveniles.
This understanding of juveniles’ involvement in crime also forms the basis of the
important policy lessons I have described. But the point can be generalized
further: the Court’s final lesson is that scientific knowledge about adolescence and
teenage involvement in crime provides a framework for the formulation of youth
crime policies that are fair to young offenders and likely to reduce reoffending.
In grounding its analysis in developmental knowledge, the Court created a
special status for juveniles in the justice system that rests on a firmer foundation
than the traditional basis for paternalistic justice policies. Underscoring this point,
153

Most successful programs seek to involve delinquents’ parents and to guide them in
performing their role effectively. If this is not possible, program staff, teachers, or foster parents, can
function as adult role models. SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 215–21 (describing effective
programs using this approach). Multi-Systemic Therapy also provides youths with tools to avoid the
influences of antisocial peers. Id.
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Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010).
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Justice Kagan in Miller emphasized that the Court’s conclusion that juveniles are
different from adults in ways that are relevant to proportionality was not based on
conventional wisdom or what “any parent knows,” 155 but on a substantial and
growing body of scientific research. This announcement confirmed the Court’s
conviction that in this context, constitutional doctrine can usefully and legitimately
be informed by scientific knowledge, precisely because developmental research is
sound and provides insight relevant to the legal question of whether sanctions that
are permitted for adult criminals are excessive as applied to juveniles.
Modern policymakers also increasingly understand that developmental
psychology and neuroscience research is relevant to the core issues that must be
addressed in formulating policies that are fair to young offenders and promote
social welfare. 156 Research informs our understanding of the developmental
factors that contribute to adolescent offending and is beginning to clarify how
changes in brain structure and functioning may be linked to increased offending in
early and mid-adolescence and to desistance as teenagers mature. 157 Of perhaps
more direct practical relevance, research on the relationship between social context
and healthy psychological maturation has contributed to the development of
programs that can provide youths with the skills and competencies needed to
negotiate the transition to adult life.158 Policy makers allocating juvenile justice
resources have also relied on empirical studies evaluating the effectiveness of these
programs. Finally, responding to research demonstrating that juveniles are less
competent to function as defendants in criminal proceedings, lawmakers have
introduced procedures to reduce the disadvantages of immaturity. 159
In general, there has been substantial movement over the past decade toward
juvenile crime regulation grounded in scientific knowledge. Moreover, with the
growing attention to adolescent brain science, this trend has generated public
interest and support. This is not to say that the sole concern of lawmakers or the
public is to further the welfare of young offenders. Promoting public safety and
holding offenders accountable continue to be top priorities of justice policy, and
155
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An important catalyst in promoting the importance of developmental science to justice
policy was the work of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation’s Research Network on
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sometimes may override other concerns. But lawmakers increasingly accept that
these interests often are furthered most effectively through developmentally based
policies.
The account of typical teenage offenders as immature adolescents “whose
crimes reflect unfortunate but transient immaturity” 160 is a far cry from the image
of remorseless superpredators that prevailed in the 1990s. The Court’s embrace of
developmental science signals its rejection of that ominous narrative and its
commitment to a normative account of adolescence that tracks empirical reality.
This move is compatible with the inclinations of modern policy makers and
reinforces an approach to youth crime regulation that has emerged in the early
twenty-first century.
CONCLUSION
In a relatively brief period, three Supreme Court opinions have substantially
expanded Eighth Amendment protections for juveniles convicted as adults of
serious crimes. The Court has broken new ground and announced a constitutional
principle with potentially far reaching implications: “children are different.” At
this point it is not clear whether the Court will apply the principle to further
enhance juveniles’ special constitutional status. But it is clear that the Court has
issued a forceful statement about the differences between adolescent and adult
criminals and the importance to legal regulation of recognizing those differences.
This statement and the perspective on juvenile offending embodied in the opinions
reinforce attitudes emerging in the past decade and are likely to be influential in
shaping the direction of juvenile crime policy going forward. In a period in which
lawmakers are open to rethinking the punitive and costly policies adopted in the
late twentieth century, the Court has offered several useful lessons that together
can shape a new wave of law reforms in the twenty-first century. A legal regime
that incorporates the Court’s lessons will punish youths less severely than adults,
individualize transfer decisions, attend to the developmental impact of sanctions,
and generally draw on scientific knowledge about adolescence to inform
regulation. This approach is both fairer to young offenders and more likely to
reduce the social cost of youth crime than the harsh policies of the 1990s.
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